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EUTHANASIA IN THE 
NETHERLANDS
Henk A.M.J. ten Have, MD, PhD, 
and Jos V.M. Welie, MMS, JD, PhD
In early February of 1993, a large majority in the Lower House of 
the Dutch Parliament passed a bill on euthanasia. This event was fol­
lowed by a stream of extremely critical commentaries in the international 
press. It was predicted in the Netherlands, however, that the Upper 
House would pass the bill. On November 30,1993, it did so, with a slim 
37-34 majority, and only after weeks of heated debate, political lobbying, 
and the threat of a more liberal proposal. On June 1, 1994, the new law 
came into force. This article, on the background of the euthanasia debate 
in the Netherlands, argues that the anxieties of some of the opponents 
of the bill certainly were justified.
The vote of the Upper House has made the Netherlands the first 
country to pass explicit legislation on this topic. It should be emphasized, 
however, that the new law does not legalize euthanasia. The law takes 
as its starting points that (1) euthanasia is to be defined as an active 
medical intervention to terminate life intentionally at the explicit request 
of the patient, and withholding or withdrawing treatment that is medi­
cally futile or refused by the patient (improperly characterized as passive 
"euthanasia") generally is accepted and legally sanctioned (since a 1973 
court case); and (2) euthanasia must remain open to legal audit (which 
is possible only if it remains a criminal offense).
Consequently, the criminal code has not been changed and the 
practice of euthanasia remains illegal. The new law emphasizes that a 
case in which death has resulted from medical actions that accelerate 
death may not be reported by the attending physician as a "natural
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death." The attending physician should report the case to the local 
coroner, who will inform the prosecutor. The latter will then decide on 
a case-by-case basis whether prosecution should follow.20
The legal foundation for this reporting procedure should enable the 
public prosecutor to assess each case of euthanasia. The physician in­
volved in a case of euthanasia must submit a written report to the 
coroner that includes the following information:
1. The patient's medical history;
2. The request to end life and to whom this request was voiced; in 
this case, two situations could occur
There was an expressed, voluntary, and carefully considered 
request of the patient;
There was no expressed request of the patient; in this case, the 
physician must explain the reason for the absent request;
3. The consultation of a colleague;
4. The means used to end life.
On the basis of this report, the public prosecutor will decide whether or 
not to prosecute. The final format of the report has been laid down in a 
General Administrative Order.
HISTORICAL BACKGROUND
In 1969, the Leiden professor of psychiatry, J.H. van den Berg, 
published a booklet titled Medical Power and Medical Ethics}  Immediately, 
this early critique of the increasing power of modern medicine became 
a bestseller, with 25 editions and translations in many languages. In it, 
van den Berg argues that new technologic capabilities of medicine had 
been counterproductive in many cases because they were guided by the 
traditional medical-ethical prescript to maintain, restore, and protect life. 
The book contains photographs, for example, of children with phocome- 
lia and hydrocephalus and of a patient whose entire body below the 
lungs and stomach had been removed. These photographs conveyed 
the message that modern medicine was applying every technique and 
intervention possible, without considering how the patients were bene­
fiting from applications of medical technology. Van den Berg argued 
that modern medicine should reorient itself, from preserving biologic 
human life to sustaining meaningful personal life.
Van den Berg's book soon was followed by other critiques, such as 
Ivan Illich's Medical Nemesis,10 illustrating with a wealth of empirical 
data that the medical establishment itself has become a major threat to 
health. Illich shows how death has become a clinically supervised event 
with people losing their right to preside over their act of dying.
Although less of an attack of the medical establishment, the contem­
porary work of Elisabeth Kubler-Ross13 also called for more emotional 
support and counseling in the final phases of human life rather than 
technical interventions. The dying person should be allowed to die his
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or her own death, but the ethos of medical interventionism precludes 
the patience and tolerance required by the respect for the process of 
dying one's own death.13
A review of the literature in the 1960s and 1970s on medicine's 
understanding of and approach towards death elucidates the euthanasia 
movement as it has arisen in the Netherlands during the last two 
decades. This movement started as a protest against medicine's growing 
tendency to alienate individuals from their own death and dying. It 
therefore emphasized respect for the patient's right to self-determination 
as the ultimate moral principle in matters of life and death. Provided it 
is the expression of the autonomous wish of the patient, the attending 
physician should respect the patient's decision to discontinue medical 
treatment. Similarly, if a patient's request for euthanasia is autonomous, 
physicians should comply with such a request. In sum, the moral princi­
ple of respect for individual autonomy was the cornerstone of the 
original ideologic theory justifying the medical practice of euthanasia.
Since the first court case in 1973, public debate on euthanasia in the 
Netherlands has become more intense.24 The past decade, however, has 
shown a shift in the euthanasia debate from the level of critical medical- 
ethical arguments, justifying or opposing euthanasia within the physi­
cian-patient relationship, to the socio-ethical and political problems of 
whether and how to regulate the actual practice of euthanasia given 
newly accumulated empirical data. Medical-ethical viewpoints regarding 
euthanasia in clinical practice have been moved to the background.
THE MEDICAL PRACTICE OF EUTHANASIA
Although active euthanasia always has been a criminal offense, in 
the past two decades medical specialists and general practitioners have 
been quite open about their euthanasia practice, publishing case reports 
in influential Dutch medical journals.17 This professional candor has 
coincided with (and probably was fostered by) a considerable judicial 
lenience towards physicians practicing euthanasia under strict condi­
tions. Among these conditions, three have been scrutinized most fre­
quently in court decisions and bills: (1) the patient's voluntary and 
persistent request; (2) the hopeless situation of the patient; and (3) 
consultation of a colleague.27
In spite of all this professional openness and legal lenience, many 
physicians who perform euthanasia have not been prepared to face the 
risk of the legal consequences of their practice, and have completed 
death certificates incorrectly. Consequently, the overall incidence of ac­
tive euthanasia in medical practice remained unknown for a long time; 
estimates varied from 2000 to 20,000 per year. In January 1990, the 
"Remmelink Committee/' comprising three lawyers and three physi­
cians, was appointed by the Minister of Justice and the Secretary for 
Public Health, to obtain an empiric understanding of the frequency and 
nature of euthanasia in medical practice. A random population of some
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400 physicians was interviewed retrospectively about their own experi­
ence with end-of-life decisions. These physicians were asked to provide 
prospectively (anonymously) the true cause of death of each of their 
dying patients in the next 6 months. Finally, an attempt also was made 
to verify the cause of death of a random sample of some 8500 recent 
deaths. In September 1991, the Committee issued its report.2 The results 
of the empirical part of the Remmelink Report have been published 
elsewhere in the English language (both the complete report and sum­
mary articles).15' 16
According to the Remmelink Report, physicians make decisions 
about their patients' deaths for some 49,000 of 130,000 patients who die 
each year. These decisions include whether to discontinue life support; 
provide increasing doses of pain medication, withhold treatment, assist 
in suicide, or commit euthanasia. Assisting in suicide was found to 
occur in only about 400 cases a year. Euthanasia, or "intentionally 
ending life/' is practiced some 2300 times, or in 5% of those 49,000 cases.
Van der Wal and colleagues25 undertook a similar exploratory, 
descriptive, retrospective study of morbidity, age, and sex of patients 
whose family practitioner helped them to die. Van der Wal found that 
in euthanasia or assisted suicide cases, 85% of the patients suffered from 
malignant neoplasm (that is, euthanasia mortality rates among patients 
with cancer were twice the normal cancer mortality rate). Euthanasia, or 
assisted suicide, also was relatively frequent among patients with AIDS 
or multiple sclerosis (more than 10 times the normal AIDS mortality 
rate). In approximately 20%, a secondary, usually chronic disease had 
been diagnosed. Van der Wal also sent questionnaires to a random 
sample of family practitioners asking them to rate 24 aspects of the 
suffering of the last patient they had euthanized and to assess the 
patient's life expectancy. According to the respondents, 90% of these 
patients showed severe physical suffering and 71% showed severe emo­
tional suffering. "General weakness or tiredness,” "dependence or being 
in need of help," "loss of dignity," and "pain" were the most frequently 
identified aspects of suffering. In 63% of the cases, life expectancy at the 
moment of execution of the request was estimated as less than 2 weeks; 
in 39% it was less than 1 week; in 3% less than a day; in 10% it was 
more than 3 months.25
THE AMBIVALENCE OF MORAL JUSTIFICATION
Mass media was quick to conclude that euthanasia apparently was 
not as frequent as assumed by both protagonists and antagonists.3 As 
argued elsewhere, this conclusion fails to take into account that many 
physicians do not interpret and classify their actions as euthanasia cases, 
even when those actions strictly fall under the range of the definition 
employed in the Netherlands; that is, an active medical intervention to 
terminate life intentionally at the explicit request of the patient.6-8 For 
example, the empirical data from the Remmelink Study reveal that
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hastening death was the explicit intention of the administration of high 
doses of "pain" medication in 6% of the total number of 22,500 cases in 
which such analgesics with a possible lethal effect were administered. 
And in an additional 30%, death was at least one of the purposes. There 
is no longer a case for indirect effect, because death is the intended, 
direct effect.
Van Delden and colleagues4 have argued that the formulation of 
the intention (i.e., hastening death) may be the same in the previously 
mentioned cases as they are in euthanasia proper, but "the 'sameness7 
of the intentions can be questioned." They claim that intentions ulti­
mately are private, and therefore, beyond public evaluation.4 The au­
thors agree that in many cases it will be very difficult to prove the 
intentions of the physician who hastens death, but this is primarily a 
lawyer's problem. Moreover, the intention of the actor has been made 
an essential element in the official definition of euthanasia and even in 
the legal definition, in spite of the foreseeable difficulties of proving the 
physician's intentions.
Even more troublesome is that the Remmelink Report has shown 
that annually, there are about 1000 patients whose death is caused or 
hastened by physicians without an explicit patient request. This number 
pertains to patients who no longer were competent to make decisions, 
yet apparently suffered severely. Not included are cases in which medi­
cally futile treatments were withheld or withdrawn, because such treat­
ments always have to be withdrawn. Although it is not clear how many 
of these cases are involuntary (i.e., the patients would have expressed 
the wish not to be euthanatized, had they been able to speak about it), 
the absence of an expressed request precludes qualifying these cases as 
euthanasia proper. Nonetheless, the committee felt that these 1000 cases 
of nonvoluntary termination of life should not be of concern. Instead, 
they should be thought of as "providing assistance to the dying." 
Nonvoluntary termination of life was justified because the suffering of 
those patients had become "unbearable" and standard medical practice 
considered their life "given up." Death would have occurred quickly 
anyway (usually within a week), if the physician would not have acted.2 
The committee adds that actively ending life when "the vital functions 
have started failing" is "indisputably normal medical practice."2
Although about a quarter of these 1000 patients previously had 
expressed the wish to die, interestingly this was not always the leading 
argument for the physicians euthanizing them. Only 17% of the physi­
cians involved in these 1000 cases mentioned "previously uttered re­
quest of the patient" as their reason to terminate their patient's life. The 
researchers explained this discrepancy by arguing that physicians more 
often are guided by their own "empathy" with the patient's unspoken 
but probable wishes, than by explicit oral or written patient requests.2' 15 
One may, of course, wonder whether such "impressions" are always 
correct. More importantly, this explanation indicates a significant shift 
in moral justification. As argued earlier, respect for autonomy always 
had been the prime argument in favor of active euthanasia, publicly
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defended by the physicians, lawyers, and courts. But now that quite a 
number of cases (between 1000 and 8000 )6~8 have occurred without an 
explicit patient request, other arguments are brought forward to defend 
this practice.
A paradox, therefore, emerges between this line of reasoning, which 
is used to justify euthanasia without explicit request, and the very 
opposite reasoning by the original advocates of voluntary euthanasia, 
who argued that suffering is a purely subjective phenomenon. Only the 
patient can decide whether his or her suffering has become unbearable. 
Termination of life is only justifiable when the patient requests it.4 It 
seems that some advocates of euthanasia use the latter strategy when 
defending the right of the competent patient to ask for euthanasia 
autonomously, and the former strategy when defending the practice of 
euthanasia on the mentally incompetent patient.
A similar ambiguity is demonstrated in Van der WaTs study.25 His 
conclusion that the majority of euthanized patients have severe physical 
and emotional suffering does not follow. It merely can be concluded 
that the physicians, in retrospect, think this about their patients.
The strategies used by the Remmelink Report and Van der Wal 
seem intended to justify physicians making judgments about their 
patient's suffering and deciding that it is better for the patient to be 
dead. Although such arguments are not without internal merits, their 
function in the euthanasia debate is rather dubious given the fact that 
euthanasia always had been justified in terms of the patient's right to 
self-determination as opposed to physician paternalism.
The medical practice of euthanasia in the Netherlands reveals that 
the ethical justification has been shifting from respect for autonomy to 
relief of suffering. But these two arguments are mutually exclusive; it only 
makes sense to talk about respect for autonomy if a physician refrains 
from making judgments about the patient's benefits. It simply is logically 
impossible to base a euthanasia decision on both autonomy and benefi­
cence, as Van Delden and colleagues5 have suggested. Moreover, the 
primacy of the bioethic principle of respect for patient autonomy always 
has been grounded in the presumed inability—or virtual inability—of 
physicians (or any other third person) to make reliable judgments on 
the patient's well-being or suffering. If, on the other hand, physicians 
now are considered to be very well able to make such judgments, the 
decisive factor is no longer the patient's own explicit request for eutha­
nasia, but the physician's concurring with the patient's assessment of 
the suffering being unbearable. The physician only will comply with the 
"autonomous” request of the patient if he or she agrees that the patient's 
suffering is, indeed, unbearable, or that the quality of the patient's life 
is so low that the patient is better off dead. In fact, the patient's request 
will be regarded as an autonomous request only if it is rational from a 
medical point of view. In this line of reasoning, nothing changes when 
the same medical rationality indicates that euthanasia is appropriate, 
but the patient is no longer able to express an autonomous wish. When
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the patient is incompetent or his or her views are unavailable, the 
physician still is capable of making the assessment.
Both empiric research and political debate reveal that in daily prac­
tice, two moral considerations compete with each other: respect for 
autonomy and relief from suffering. From the physician's point of view, 
the latter consideration appears to be the most important; it is the prime 
motive to perform euthanasia in cases of incompetent patients who, in 
the judgment of the physicians, suffer unbearably. It is also a strong 
motive in cases of competent patients because less than a third of all 
requests are fulfilled,2,15 This implies that the outcome of the euthanasia 
debate is paradoxical; physicians now seem to have ultimate control 
over the moral justification of active euthanasia. The moral sensibility 
and judgment of the medical profession is apparently the only safeguard 
against abuses. It is unclear why and how medical professionals are 
competent to make judgments about their patients' suffering, and 
whether they have the right to do so—a question Van der Wal raises 
but leaves unanswered.26 Intervention-driven medical technology has 
led to the euthanasia movement in the first place, yet there is no sign 
that this characteristic of medicine has changed significantly. The initial 
cause of the problem is now considered the prime solution to it.
THE CULTURE OF DEATH
Amazingly, the Remmelink Committee's revelation of approxi­
mately 1000 cases annually of unrequested termination of life has caused 
little outcry in the Netherlands. In fact, the number of advocates of 
nonvoluntary termination of the life of an incompetent patient only 
seems to have increased. Recently, professional committees (of the Royal 
Dutch Medical Association, the Dutch Society of Pediatricians, and the 
Dutch Society of Psychiatry) have argued that actively terminating the 
life of certain comatose patients and disabled newborns can be morally 
justifiable. In regard to patients suffering from psychiatric illnesses, it is 
argued that their disorder does not reduce their voluntary decision­
making competency; hence, the acceptability of euthanasia cannot be 
ruled out a priori.12' 18,19
These developments reveal a growing tendency to regard active 
euthanasia as normal medical practice; it is the rational response in 
hopeless cases. In early 1994, a court dismissed the case of a psychiatrist 
who had assisted in the suicide of a woman who was stricken by grief, 
but not psychiatrically diseased.23 About the same time, a Minister of 
the Dutch Government stated in an interview in a women's magazine 
that he would like to have a suicide pill at hand when he was growing 
old.22 Lastly, the Dutch Society for Voluntary Euthanasia advocated that 
everyone who fears to be admitted to a nursing home should have a 
declaration ready requesting euthanasia in case of lasting admittance to 
a nursing home.11
One reasonably may assume that incompetent patients, had they
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been competent, would have requested euthanasia. If physicians are 
unwilling to comply with such reasonable requests, maybe they should 
be pressured to comply anyway. Indeed, in early March of 1993, the 
Society for Voluntary Euthanasia brought a case to the newspapers of a 
65-year-old woman with multiorgan cancer. Her family practitioner did 
not want to comply with her request for euthanasia. She consulted 
the Society, which concluded that euthanasia was justified clearly and 
consequently publicized the case to elicit public pressure.21
Such events, furthermore, indicate a significant change in attitude, 
not only toward death and dying, but toward suffering, growing old, 
and being dependent on long-term care. Nursing home physicians, 
rightly, reacted against the Society's proposals, arguing that they only 
enhance popular prejudices against nursing homes without taking into 
account the positive effects that treatment and care can accomplish.9
Social developments toward nonvoluntary termination of life, de­
spite the ideologic framework emphasizing patient autonomy, are unde­
niable. One of the underlying reasons for this development is the ambiv­
alence of ethical justifications, discussed previously. A second reason is 
the blurred distinction between active and passive euthanasia. Authori­
tative Dutch ethicists, such as Kuitert, have argued that the distinction 
between active and passive euthanasia is no longer relevant; the physi­
cian is thought to bear responsibility for the patient's death, not only 
when actively terminating the patient's life, but also when withdrawing 
lifesaving treatment.14
Ignoring the moral significance of the intentions of the physician has 
far-reaching consequences. Not only does it nullify the moral distinctions 
between withholding or withdrawing medical treatment (resulting in 
the patient's death) and active termination of life (causing the patient's 
death); it also implies that if a physician has withdrawn life-sustaining 
treatment, and the patient does not die, the physician must be prepared 
to end the patient's life. Moral consistency would require this second 
step, which is what Kuitert defends.14
This line of argument (besides being fallacious) clearly misrepre­
sents actual medical practice. Undeniably, the Remmelink Report has 
shown that cases do occur in which treatment is discontinued primarily 
to hasten the patient's death. But there is no doubt that death is not 
always the intended outcome of a physician's discontinuing treatment. 
Treatment, in many cases, is withdrawn because it is deemed medically 
futile, and therefore, no longer beneficial to the patient. Conversely, if 
available medical remedies were not judged medically futile, treatment 
would have been continued and the patient would not have died.
Simply because some cases of letting patients die are justified, it
does not follow that all such cases are justified. Some cases of letting a
patient die clearly are unjustified, for example, when a patient is left to
die when beneficial treatment is available. Here the treatment is not
given because someone simply wants the patient to die. In such cases,
there is, indeed, no morally relevant difference between killing and 
letting die. 6
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There is yet another reason to uphold the moral significance of 
the distinction between discontinuing medically futile treatment and 
withdrawing beneficial treatment in an attempt to hasten death. Catego­
rizing all forms of withholding and withdrawing medical treatment as 
euthanasia is possible only on the assumption that such withdrawals 
are acts of ending human life. That assumption, however, is mistaken. 
When medically futile treatment is discontinued, the life of a patient 
ends; but the agent ending the patient's life is not the physician. It is the 
disease, the underlying pathology, or the patient's general condition that 
is the cause of death. In such instances, the physician is not morally 
responsible for the patient's subsequent death. Any other interpretation 
leads to hypertrophy of physicians' responsibilities; they would be mor­
ally responsible for the entire course of regretful events, even if they are 
unable to give that course of events a positive turn. This hypertrophy is 
counterproductive because it fails to recognize that medicine has its 
limits; some conditions are not able to be manipulated by medical 
interventions. When a patient is suffering and is no longer benefiting 
from medical care, treatment should be terminated, not the patient's life. 
Because of its aggressive interventionism and its inability to acquiesce, 
medicine could be instrumental in creating conditions that lead patients 
to request active euthanasia.
THE (IM)POSSIBJLJTY OF PUBLIC CONTROL
Rejecting euthanasia as normal medical practice implies that partic­
ular acts of euthanasia are in need of additional ethical justification. But 
how is review and evaluation of the euthanizing physician's justification 
to be carried out? Although it is too early to evaluate the effect of the 
new law, which only came into effect on June 1, 1994, the odds clearly 
are against a significant change of the current practice of euthanasia.
First, society's possibilities for controlling the practice of euthanasia 
are entirely dependent on the cooperation of those who are involved in 
this illegal practice. Since November 1990, new state regulations have 
required physicians to report cases of euthanasia to the local coroner 
and the public prosecutor. In almost none of these cases has prosecution 
followed. The number of reports rose from 454 cases in 1990, to 591 in
1991, 1323 in 1992, and 1318 in 1993. This is a considerable increase, but 
the number is merely half of the 2300 cases of euthanasia detected by 
the Remmelink Committee; more than half of the cases apparently 
remain unreported.
Second, the new law itself is unusual. Maintaining that euthanasia 
is illegal under the Penal Code, it is paradoxical to amend another law 
requiring the trespassers to disclose their illegal deed. Normally, crimi­
nals cannot be required to assist in their own conviction; actually, they 
have all kinds of rights hindering their conviction. This problem is 
even more pressing in cases of nonvoluntary termination of life. The 
government has stated that it would be extremely undesirable if the
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practice of norwoluntary termination of life were to escape legal scrutiny. 
It is mandated, therefore, for physicians to disclose their actions in the 
same way that they are supposed to do in cases of voluntary euthanasia. 
At the same time, the Minister of Justice announced that, unlike volun­
tary euthanasia, in cases of nonvoluntary termination of life the public 
prosecutor will, in principle, start proceedings. Again, it is quite para­
doxical to require physicians to assist in their own arrests by disclosing 
their actions, even more so when those actions legally constitute one of 
the most serious crimes (i.e., murder). Obviously, as soon as the intention 
to prosecute all cases of nonvoluntary termination is carried out, it is 
quite unlikely that physicians involved in such cases will continue 
to report.
Third, the law is also very unusual in that it prescribes how to 
commit a serious crime—it even provides physicians with official docu­
ments to be used when disclosing this crime. This paradox aptly illus­
trates the ambiguous stance of the government (and society at large) 
towards euthanasia. On the one hand, it considers killing human beings, 
though seriously ill and on the verge of death, an extremely problematic 
practice requiring legal restrictions and judicial review. On the other 
hand, the government seems unwilling to scrutinize the medical profes­
sion rigorously. It sides with the profession's view that deviations from 
normal medical practice by individual physicians within the intimate 
relationship with their patient are to be considered indications of respect 
for personal wishes and conscientious decisions. Obviously, with this 
mutual trust and respect between physician and patient, the privacy of 
their relationship cannot be open to public scrutiny. If euthanasia is the 
prerogative of physicians, their conscientiousness cannot be doubted at 
the same time. Remarkably, this line of argument is accepted widely. 
Despite two decades of sharp criticism of the power of the medical 
profession, when it comes to decisions about life and death, Dutch 
physicians seem only to have gained in the unconditional trust of soci- 
ety.
SUMMARY
The present situation in the Netherlands leads to the following three 
conclusions: (1) in daily health care practices, the crucial distinction 
between voluntary and nonvoluntary termination of life is losing mean­
ing; (2) contrary to previous decades, society tends to accept cases of 
nonvoluntary termination of life more easily. The Remmelink Committee 
does not consider these cases morally troublesome. Indeed, the new 
legislative proposals simply include nonvoluntary termination of life in 
the same disclosure regulation that governs voluntary termination of 
life; and (3) although the Dutch debate on euthanasia began as a protest 
against contemporary medicine's power over death and dying, the gen­
eral acceptance of euthanasia and the recent legislation may increase 
medical power by shifting the balance further in the direction of physi-
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dans. Euthanasia is, after all, the ultimate step in medical intervention­
ism; suffering is to be relieved by any means, even if it entails the 
elimination of the sufferer.
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